The received wisdom, of course, is more often likely to predict Republicans' electoral invulnerability, and for good reasons. First, transformation of the South from solid "blue" to "red" is said to have created a substantial base for the Republican Party in both congressional and presidential elections. Second, population movement to the south and west, as well as GOP capture of numerous state legislatures in the South, has made redistricting following the decennial census (and in Given the distribution of the vote across the states, analysts of recent elections conclude that neither party has an electoral base sufficient to guarantee victory in 2008, and short-term forces could easily swing the election to either party. Moreover, when the president's party has controlled the White House for two or more terms, the incumbent party more often loses than wins in the following electionmaking 2008 a "time for a change" election.5 Since World War II, when the president's party has controlled the White House for two or more terms, the incumbent party has won just one-third of the ensuing elections. Why will such small margins be so consequential for Republicans? Call it the curse of overreaching: today's mostly moderate public is unlikely to reward a majority party that pursues an ideologically polarizing agenda. Large majorities can suffer the consequences of a disaffected public, but slim majorities in an era of polarized parties cannot. As I suggest below, slim congressional majorities face distinct procedural hurdles to achieving their policy goals, hurdles that will affect their party's electoral future adversely.
To detect the impact of slim majorities, consider first the electoral context in which the Republican majority must maneuver. Today's legislative parties are extremely polarized, with few moderate legislators left in the political center. Although polarization has been increasing over the past two decades, most Americans remain solidly in the ideological middle." Yet despite the Republicans' narrow majorities and Americans' centrist tendencies, Republican majorities have governed as if with a sweeping conservative mandate. Bush's policy proposals in 2001 were Sarah A. Binder is professor ofpolitical science at George Washington University (binder@gwu.edu) and a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. Symposium I Ten Years from Now ambitious and, as many have noted, "off-center," including tax cuts, education vouchers, faith-based initiatives, and privatization of social security-an agenda crafted to appeal to the Republicans' conservative base.7 Bush's interpretation of the 2004 election summed up his party's view best: "I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it."8 If mandate elections are marked by their sweeping scope and unexpected character, then Bush's stock of political capital is unlikely to buy him and his party much success in his second term.9 Could overreaching by slim majorities in today's electoral environment cost Republicans control of the House or Senate? My hunch is yes, given the policy and procedural consequences of narrow majorities. Slim majorities make majority coalitions tough to build and to sustain. A handful of defections can cost the majority its coalition.10 Moreover, we know from two centuries of House politics that small, cohesive majorities are especially prone to manipulate the rules of the game to their advantage; threatened by minority obstruction, majorities alter the rules to secure their policy goals.11 Not surprisingly, given the difficulty of building winning coalitions, Republican House majorities since 2001 have relied much more heavily than did their predecessors on restrictive rules: nearly half of all special rules in the 108th Congress (2003-4) allowed the minority party to offer just one substitute amendment on the floor or allowed no amendments at all. Such limitations on the minority have been deemed necessary by Speaker Denny Hastert, given the GOP's narrow margin of control and the lack of Democratic votes for GOP initiatives.12
In a legislative body with so few centrist members, reliance on restrictive rules that limit votes on moderate alternatives is bound to produce more ideologically polarized outcomes-as evidenced by GOP legislative victories on economic policy (for example, enactment of tax cuts heavily skewed to upper income taxpayers) and on social policy (for example, intervention in the end-of-life decisions of Terry Schiavo). In structuring votes between an unacceptable vote for the status quo and a vote for a polarized alternative, centrist members of the majority party are often unable to vote for outcomes that best reflect their constituents' preferences. Such votes at times cost centrists their seats, as moderate Democrat Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky learned the hard way in 1993 after voting for President Bill Clinton's budget.
Senate Republicans have been equally aggressive-to the extent chamber rules allow-in exploiting the rules of the game to secure more polarized outcomes. The use of multiple reconciliation bills has protected Republican initiatives from both Democratic filibusters and Republican moderates who might otherwise vote against cloture.13 And stung by Democratic filibusters and wavering moderates, Republican leaders have sought to "go nuclear"-despite a disapproving public-to ban filibusters on judicial nominations.14 These procedural tactics are made necessary given the narrow margin held by a conservative chamber majority seeking noncentrist outcomes.
Can overreaching on policy and procedure cost Republicans control of Congress? To the extent that Republicans succeed in securing their party's policy goals, resulting legislation is more likely to be off-center, catering to the majority's base. Conversely, to the degree that Republicans falter in pursuing their agenda, they are likely to be blamed for inaction. Neither outcome is likely to be rewarded over the next decade by a persistently moderate public. In fact, public approval of both the president and Congress had slipped markedly by spring 2005. In March 2001, 55 percent of the public approved of the way Congress was doing its job; four years later, just 37 percent approved-its lowest rating in almost a decade and a far cry from the 84 percent who gave Congress high marks after the attacks of September 11.15 President Bush's approval rating at the same time-the end of the first one hundred days of his second term-was under 50 percent.16 Summary evaluations of the president have, of course, strongly predicted the vote in nearly every election in postwar America.17 Moderate publics are unlikely to sustain unified-and often overreaching-Republican rule over the decade to come. We tune in first to BLEAK REALISM. As the fog clears, we glimpse a gathering of extremely cool people dressed in all black. They are discussing equality, hegemony, discourse, alterity, domination, preliminary steps toward the possibility of articulating the possibility of an emancipatory politics, and more laborious bits of jargon I can't quite make out. The conversation is liberally peppered with new forms of exotic leftism, preferably with Continental conceptual lineages and surnames, though oldies and goodies (Lukacs, Habermas, Foucault, Zizek, Agamben) still get their share of fond and uncertainly ironic airtime. (Come on, I can't be called on to predict the names of yetunheard-of theorists.) Peering over my shoulder, you're baffled by what seems like a conceptual shell game, with too many abstractions chasing too few particulars. Still, many of the participants really are exceedingly intelligent, and if you could burst in to complain that you can't make out quite what it is they want to say, they would remind you that it's not as though the rest of political science does without repellent jargon. They invite you to join their merry band: with some years of sustained reading and study, you too could talk this way. But I predict you'll politely decline-and then my crystal ball goes blank. Not to worry: a new channel bursts into focus. At BRAVE NEW WORLD, bespectacled young men with facial hairsomehow women seem in very short supply here-are huddled over computers. Dust-covered busts of Kenneth Arrow and William Riker are leaning over, atop an old file cabinet strewn with economics journals. This time the transmission is good enough that I can make contact with the ghostly denizens of the future. "Modeling?" I ask. I get a snippy yes; then one of the younger and brighter whippersnappers asks facetiously, "What else?" "N-dimensional issue spaces? Cycling? Structure-induced equilibria?" I persist. One looks confusedly at another. "Is this guy a historian of political theory?" he asks. The other shrugs. The Don Herzog teaches law and political theory at the University ofMichigan (dherzog@umich.edu).
